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-Introduction 
There are many perspectives about 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
how the Ministry of 
in Japan works. These 
perceptions are, usually, framed as Japan, Inc. - viewing Japan as 
a monolithic government/industrial complex, with excessive 
targeting of industries and significant administrative guidance 
given to firms from above. 
Upon studying MITI, it became evident that there is no clear 
explanation about the importance of the bureaucracy in the 
industrial policy of MITI. There are vast amounts of published 
material about what MITI does and how they do it. However, much 
less is known about the industrial policies I effectiveness and 
efficiencies in resource allocations, and the "theory" behind MITI. 
This paper will examine in depth the roles of the bureaucracy in 
guiding the Japanese economy and industrial sector. 
The best descriptions regarding the role of the Japanese 
bureaucracy comes from Daniel I. Okimoto and Masahiko Aoki. Both 
put forth relatively the same interpretation of the role of the 
bureaucrat. Okimoto describes the role as "bureaupluralism," while 
Aoki uses the term "administrative pluralism." Because of the 
similarities of their viewpoints, this paper will rely on the 
descript.ion by Aoki of the bureaucracy in the Japanese economy. 
Sect.ion one of this paper provides background information on 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). section 
two traces the development of the ministry and human relations in 
-Japanese society. Section three explains MITI' s role in the 
economy and how "administrative guidance works." section four 
provides a description of the current generally accepted viewpoint 
on the Japanese bureaucratic system. Finally, section five 
evaluates the allocative efficiency of the ministry. 
section I 
Background Information 
There are many stereotypes in American perceptions of the 
industrial policies of Japan. The perceptions are often influenced 
by impressions of the high growth rate period of Japan - from the 
early 1950s to the early 1970s - when the industrial policy of 
Japan is alleged to have achieved its success. These perceptions 
are, usually, phrased as "Japan, Inc." In reality, all nations 
pursue an "industrial policy" of some sort. All democratic 
governments intervene in the free market - through fiscal and 
monetary policy, as well as other measures - in order to achieve 
desirable results. These policies, as long as they do not 
interfere with international trade, are consistent with the rules 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
The Japanese objectives and means of pursuing their industrial 
policy have changed over the years. Early postwar policy focused 
on economic recovery and emphasized export-promotion measures. In 
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1960, import liberalization began, and in 1964, direct export 
subsidies were phased out. Since the 1970s, the Japanese have 
pursued two objectives in their industrial policies. The first 
objective of Japanese industrial policy has been to help tllagging" 
industries essentially restructure themselves with governmental 
guidance. An example is the aluminum refining industry that was 
hit hard by the two oil crises. For these depressed industries, 
the goal is not to maintain the status gyQ, but to promote 
elimination of excess capacity, industrial consolidation, 
technological development, energy conservation and other 
revitalization efforts. The second objective for industrial policy 
in Japan is to promote development of new technologies that have 
potential for stimulating economic growth. 
contrary to popular belief in the united States, the level of 
government funding in Japan is relatively modest. In fact, the 
United States government accounts for 48% of all research and 
development, whereas the Japanese government only provides 28% of 
all research and development spending (Asao 25). In almost all 
cases, the adjustment policies in Japan have been accomplished with 
an increase in import volume. During the 1970-82 adjustment 
program in the aluminum industry, 57% of domestic capacity was 
eliminated, while imports rose from 28% to 79% (Asao 25) • The 
question often arises, then why is Japan so successful? 
Some analysts believe it is due to explicit Japanese policy of 
"targeting" industries. They believe that the government selects 
specific high-technology sectors, protects them with tariff 
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measures and intensively subsidizes them for eventual export 
purposes. However, in fact, Japanese tariffs on semiconductors, 
computers, optical fibers, machine tools, etc. are comparable to or 
lower than those of the united states and of the European Community 
(Asao 25). Japanese tariff policy may be more visible than the 
united states' policy, but the United states has pursued various 
policies to stimulate high productivity and international 
competitiveness among its domestic industries most notably 
aerospace and agriculture. 
It should also be noted that Japan's non-tariff barriers are 
an important part of their economy. The use of Japanese language, 
culture and tradition often hinders most foreign businessmen. 
Furthermore, Japan's rickety, old-fashioned distribution system is 
a maj or non-tariff barrier itself. "Most Japanese wholesalers 
handle only a few products and cover a small part of the country. 
They are bound together in a multilayered lattice, and half of 
their trade is among themselves rather than with suppliers and 
retailers" (Taylor 267). Unless a foreign producer can establish 
their own distribution network, its products will be handled by 
many middlemen before they reach the consumer. Although the United 
states and the European Community (EC) have chipped away at many of 
Japan's non-tariff barriers, those that remain are supported by 
constituencies that are so politically powerful that the Japanese 
government is not willing to pay the price for their removal. 
Japanese industrial policy recognizes the market as the 
primary agent of economic activity. The government does not 
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intervene in the management of individual firms nor has it 
nationalized industries in financial distress. Instead of pursuing 
a state-run capitalism, the Japanese government stimulates growth 
by supplementing and "complementing" market forces. "It 
anticipates major developments that will affect the nation's 
economy and encourages the private sector to make the necessary 
adjustments as smoothly as possible" (Tucker 22). 
The lead agency in the formulation and implementation of 
Japanese industrial policy is the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI), which was formed after World War II to 
reconstruct the war-torn economy of Japan. "In addition to making 
industrial policy, MITI manages Japan's foreign trade and 
commercial relations, runs the patent office, and ensures that 
industry obtains an adequate supply of energy and raw materials" 
(Tucker 22). 
Despi te its influence, the financial resources of MITI are 
relatively small. In fiscal year 1983, it only received 1.6% of 
the government budget and spent a total of $260 million on research 
and development. Also, the majority of the 2,500 bureaucrats of 
MITI are not technical specialists, but are well-trained civil 
servants with a solid grasp of the international market place. 
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-Section II 
Brief History 
The planned rational system of government was introduced in the 
pre-war era in Japan. Meiji Japan began to shift away from State 
entrepreneurship to collaboration with privately owned enterprises. 
It favored those enterprises that were capable of rapidly adopting 
new technologies and that were committed to the national goals of 
economic development and military strength. The Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry was created in 1925 (Johnson 83). 
On October 31, 1943 the Diet passed the Munitions Company Law 
(Gunju Kaisha Ho) which authorized the stationing of government 
officials in each factory and made them responsible for seeing that 
goals were fulfilled and rules followed (Johnson 167). This law 
established the principle of the separation of management from 
ownership. Also, the Munitions Company Law helped reorganize the 
economic ministries by abolishing the Cabinet Planning Board, 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, Ministry af Communications, and Ministry of Railroads. 
Furthermore, on November 1, 1943, the Ministry of Munitions was 
established (Johnson 167). The Ministry of Munitions established 
nine regional Munitions Supervision Departments, which are the 
contemporary MITI regional bureaus. The main significance of the 
Ministry of Munitions is that later MITI managed to retain all the 
functions including electric power generating, airplane 
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-manufacturing, and industrial planning - brought together by the 
Ministry of Munitions. 
In 1949, the Japanese abolished the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry and the Board of Trade and combined their former functions 
into one ministry called the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (Johnson 191). Also during 1949, Supreme Commander of 
Allied Forces - Pacific headquarters (SCAP) began a policy of 
transferring some of its controlling and supervisory powers to the 
Japanese government. On February 2, 1949, SCAP delegated to the 
Japanese government all control over foreign exchange accruing from 
international trade. It also ordered the creation of the Foreign 
Exchange Control Board to supervise the investment of these funds 
in industries that were essential to the economic recovery of 
Japan. SCAP, also, encouraged the Japanese to pass the Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. One of the provisions of 
this law required any citizen who acquired foreign exchange to turn 
it over to a government account, and then the Foreign Exchange 
Control Board was put in charge of how these funds were used. 
until the end of the occupation, the Economic Stabilization Board 
(ESB) drew up periodic foreign exchange budgets to spend the 
accumulated foreign exchange. On August 1, 1952, the ESB and the 
Foreign Exchange Control Board were abol ished. The powers to enact 
and supervise the foreign exchange budget were transferred to the 
newly created Budget Section of the International Trade Bureau of 
MIT! • At the same time, the power of the old Foreign Capital 
Committee of the ESB to supervise all imports of technology and all 
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joint ventures were transferred to the Industrial Finance section 
of the Enterprises Bureau of MITI. After these changes were 
completed, MITI came to possess weapons of control and management 
that exceeded anything its predecessors had ever known during the 
prewar and postwar time periods (Johnson 194). 
SCAP believed that the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law of December 1949 was merely temporary. The act 
authorized the government to maintain control over foreign exchange 
and foreign trade transactions to the extent necessary to safeguard 
the balance of international payments. In effect, it transferred 
responsibilities exercised by SCAP since the beginning of the 
occupati.on. "The restrictions in the law were to be gradually 
relaxed by cabinet orders and ministerial ordinances as the need 
for them subsided (Johnson 194)." The law was not "gradually 
relaxed" by the Japanese government and remained on the books well 
into the 1980s. It was the single most important instrument of 
industrial guidance and control that MITI ever possessed (Johnson 
195). "As Leon Hollerman put it from the perspective of 1979, 'In 
liquidating the occupation by 'handing back' operational control to 
the Japanese, SCAP naively presided over the institutionalization 
of the most restrictive foreign trade and foreign exchange control 
system ever devised by a major free nation'" (Johnson 195). 
The eruption of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 ended the 
stabilization panic created in Japan by Joseph Morrell Dodge's 
(1890-1964) inflation control methods. However, the war created 
new problems for Japanese companies. They could not keep 
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-investment capital to finance orders placed by the Americans. This 
problem led to a two-tier structure of government-guaranteed "city-
bank" overloans and newly created government-owned "banks of last 
resort. " The banks of last-resort, particularly the Japan 
Development Bank (Nihon Kaihatsu Ginko, abbreviated as 'Kaigin
'
), 
came to possess powers over the whole economy as a result of their 
decision to make or refuse "policy loans" (Johnson 200). 
The system of overdraft loans saved Japanese companies from the 
short-term pressure of stockholders which was an advantage when 
competing with Americans. The overdraft system required an 
industry to get a loan for expansion from a commercial bank. The 
commercial bank would go the Bank of Japan to insure their loan. 
The Bank of Japan controls overdrafts and follows the guidelines on 
how much money to extend based on recommendations from the 
Enterprise Bureau of MITI. The overdraft system increased civilian 
demands, which the government wanted anyway, for the protection of 
the Japanese economy. 
The overdraft system in Japan helped to form the bank keiretsu 
(conglomerate groups) as successors to the old zaibatsu, which was 
dismantled during the occupation. The companies became dependent 
on the banks for capital, and the banks depended on the success of 
the firms because of the heavy indebtedness of the firms to the 
banks. The "Big Six" bank keiretsu in the 1950s were Fuji, Sanwa, 
Dai Ichi, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo (Johnson 205). The 
typical keiretsu group contained a bank which provided capital, 
several industrial firms, and a general trading company that 
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-provided raw materials and sold exports. Many of the old family 
zaibatsq re-established themselves as bank keiretsus in this 
structure. For example, Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoj i 
zaibatsus were dissolved on November 30, 1947. They were 
liquidated on August 31, 1950. In 1952 Mitsubishi recombined into 
the bank keiretsu structure, as did Mitsui in 1955 (Johnson 206). 
The keiretsu is an industrial group that consists of vertical 
or conglomerate groupings of companies that are characterized by 
long-term association, cross-holdings of stock, extensive business 
dealings, or sharing of company name. The keiretsu do not violate 
antitrust laws in Japan, but their actions can. 
The two types of industrial ties are either conglomerates or 
vertical groupings. Today, there are eight major keiretsu 
organized into conglomerates using the following ties: cross-
holdings of shares, presidential councils, intra-group financing by 
a common bank, mutual appointment of officers, use of a trading 
company for market organization projects, and joint investments in 
new industries. conglomerate ties give easier financing through 
member banks and 14-22% of the stock is owned through cross-
holdings. 
In comparison is the vertically integrated keiretsu in Japan 
today. No criteria distinguish them from other large vertical 
groupings. vertical keiretsu hold the shares of each other, 
exchange information, and cooperate in new ventures. The closest 
relations are between buyer and supplier or between the parent 
company and its suppliers. These close links substitute for legal 
10 
work. Mutual trust allows for differences to be resolved. For 
example, one side will take a loss for another, knowing that 
someday the opposite will reciprocate. Moreover, the Japanese 
system of permanent employment reinforces this keiretsu system. 
MITI helped to rebuild the trading companies (zaibatsu) into the 
keiretsl,! by issuing laws that authorized tax write-offs for the 
cost of opening foreign branches and for contingency funds against 
bad debt trade contracts. MITI went so far as to assign an 
enterprise to a trading company if the enterprise did not have one. 
MITI managed to condense the 2,800 trading companies after 
occupation down to 20 big companies. Each of these companies 
served a bank keiretsu or cartel of smaller producers. The bank 
groups were very much like the old zaibatsus, except that the 
groups were better managed and more competitive (Johnson 206). 
In December 1949, the Industrial Rationalization Council 
(Sangyo Gorika Shingikai) was created. The purpose of this Council 
was to act as a liaison between business and government. Although 
the Industrial Rationalization Council had no authority to enforce 
its proposals on a particular enterprise, its sponsor, MIT I , could 
and did cut off access to foreign exchange of any firm MITI felt 
was wasting valuable resources (Johnson 217). 
Once the occupation had ended, Prime Minister Yoshida ordered 
a general review of the executive branch and all laws and 
ordinances inherited from the SCAP era. During this time, MITI 
totally reorganized itself. The revisions of MITI put it on a 
collision course with the SCAP-created institution, the Fair Trade 
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commission (FTC; Kosei Torihiki Iinkai), which overlooked and 
administered the Antimonopoly Law (formerly called the Law Relating 
to the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and to Methods of Preserving 
Fair Trade) (Shiteki Dokusen No Kinshi Ayobi Kosei Torihiki No 
Kakuho Ni Kan Suru Horitsu) (Johnson 221). 
To better comprehend the activities of MITI, it is first 
important to understand the Japanese indi vidual character. In 
Chalmers Johnson's book, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 
Kusayanagai Daizo puts forth the argument that all human relations 
in Japanese society are based on four kinds of "factions" (batsu): 
keibats4 (family and matrimonial cliques); kyodobatsu (clansmen, or 
persons from the same locality); gakubatsu (school and university 
classmates); and zaibatsu (factions based on money, a term that 
should not be confused with its specific reference to the family-
dominated industrial empires, or zaibatsu, of pre-war Japan). All 
of these relations occur in the bureaucracy of MITI (Johnson 55). 
First, evidence of keibatsu relationships can be found in MITI. 
These ties are not accidents. Many young bureaucrats ask their 
seniors to arrange their marriages, and the senior bureaucrat will 
often have keibatsu considerations in mind when proposing matches. 
In fact, some MIT! officials feel that it is better for one's 
career to have good keibatsu than a poor one. During the period 
1949-1959, it was even found that higher civil servants had more 
prominent father-in-Iaws rather than prominent fathers (Johnson 
56) • 
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Second, kyodobatsu are similarly present among Japanese 
bureaucrats. The former MITI vice-minister, Tokunaga Hisatsugu 
(executive director of New Japan Steel after retirement) was from 
the same area of Fukuoka prefecture - that is, they both belonged 
to the same kyoto (literally, "village party") as his "senior" 
(sempai) Minister Ishii Mutsujiro. 
Third, although keibatsu and kyodobatsu are part of any large 
Japanese organization, gakubatsu relationships are by far the 
single most influential force within the Japanese bureaucracy. 
"The cliques of university classmates are inseparable from 
bureaucratic life because it is their university degrees and their 
success in passing the Higher-level Public Officials Examination 
that set bureaucrats apart from other elites in society" (Johnson 
57) . Gakubatsu forms the largest "old boy" network throughout 
Japanese society as a whole. 
Section III 
What MITI Does 
The first move by MITI into "administrative guidance" was on 
February 25, 1952. At this time the SCAP-created Temporary 
Materials Supply and Demand Control Law had expired. This law 
allowed MCI to exercise absolute control over all commodities in 
the domestic economy. MIT I contended that allowing this law to 
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expire demonstrated their liberal and less control-oriented 
ministry. However, MITI still controlled the foreign exchange 
budgets and used them to carry out their pol icies. On February 25, 
1952, MITt informally advised 10 large cotton spinners to reduce 
their production by 40% and the Ministry assigned quotas to each 
individual firm. MITI reminded those enterprises that 
if they rejected this "administrative guidance" that foreign 
currency allocations for their next month's supply of raw cotton 
might not be available. The FTC said that the action of MIT I was 
illegal .. but the Ministry replied that the Antimonopoly Law did not 
cover informal advice from the government, and it persisted in its 
policies (Johnson 225). 
Many of the laws of MITI following occupation helped to form 
their "guidance" policy. For example, the Special Measures Law for 
the Stabilization of Designated Medium and Smaller Enterprises and 
Exports Transaction Law authorized MITI to create cartels among 
small businesses as exceptions to the Antimonopoly Law. Another 
new institution created in 1950 was the Japanese External Trade 
organization (JETRO). This institution was set up to overcome the 
problem of "blind trade," the view that manufacturers were 
operating without detailed information on what they should be 
producing for various foreign markets. Also, they lacked agents to 
monitor changes in tariff rates and specifications for products, as 
well as, marketing new Japanese products. The JETRO was 
established to do these things (Johnson 230). The JETRO was 
transformed into a public corporation with all of its capital 
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coming from the central government. 
personnel to JETRO starting in 1951. 
MITI also provided key 
Another policy shift that helped "administrative guidance" were 
the adjustments by the Ministry of Finance in ~he Taxation Special 
Measures Law. During the occupation by SCAP, Professor Carl S. 
Shoup of Columbia University accompanied Dodge to Japan. The Shoup 
mission helped simplify the tax system with an aggregated income 
tax, as well as, eliminating special tax benefits and creating a 
locally controlled value-added tax. The main problem of the 
adjustments to the Special Measures Law by Shoup were that they 
were hostile to the preferential treatment of strategic industries 
(Johnson 233). In 1951, however, the Ministry of Finance, in 
consultation with the Enterprises Bureau of MITI and the Industrial 
Rationalization Council, proceeded to slowly revise the old 
Taxation Special Measures Law, which totally dismantled the Shoup 
system. The revisions helped businesses by creating two types of 
reserve funds - hikiatekin and jumbikin. Hikiatekin are normal, 
accepted reserves of the sort found in corporation tax laws of most 
nations. Jumbikin provide for tax deferment, not tax exemption. 
Used creatively, jumbikin can free a company of all taxes during a 
given year. Both types of reserves can be excluded from taxable 
profits (Johnson 234). 
Contrary to popular belief, industrial policy in Japan is not 
imposed from above, but emerges from a continual process of 
consultation between government and industry. MITI uses 
"administrative guidance, It a unique Japanese form of official 
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persuasion, to convince the private sector to comply with its 
policies. Since the statutory powers of MITI are limited, it does 
not attempt to enforce its will through the legal system. In fact, 
if it did, companies would challenge MITI in court and win. 
Instead, MITI backs up its advice with a variety of incentives and 
disincentives. The incentives include subsidies, tax incentives, 
and directed research and development projects; the disincentives 
include "gentle arm-twisting" and implicit threats of new 
legislation. Even with the disincentives, private firms are likely 
to resist administrative guidance if they believe their interests 
diverge significantly from the definition of national interest of 
MITI (Tucker 25). 
One of the most effective tools of MITI for achieving influence 
is to work with industry and other interest groups to build a 
unified "vision" of the future industrial policy of Japan that will 
best meet the changes in the international marketplace. The forums 
for this "vision-making" are some 30 "deliberative councils," such 
as the Economic Council. Included in these councils are 
representatives from trade associations, government, academia, mass 
media, labor, and consumer and public interest groups. These 
various groups discuss which industries and technologies should be 
targeted for special favors and which industries are noncompetitive 
and should be phased out. The consensus that emerges from the 
"vision-making" by these bodies is published (as a "white paper") 
and distributed throughout Japan. Al though this document is 
supposed to serve as a guideline for corporate strategic planning, 
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the extent of compliance is left up to the firms in the private 
sector (Tucker 25). 
An example of how this consensual relationship works is found 
in the Economic Council. Economic planning is officially discussed 
and formulated by the Economic Council at the request of the Prime 
Minister and then reported to the Cabinet for its official 
sanction. While the Economic Council is dominated by businessmen, 
all the various other constituent groups are represented. The 
Prime Minister sets the general orientation of the plan at the 
outset by the intention in his letter of request for planning. 
Economic planning then becomes a consensus- formulating process 
within that framework. The Planning Bureau of the Economic 
Planning Agency functions as secretary for the Economic Council and 
prepares a draft of all ideas from the meetings subject to minor 
revisions at the final meeting of the council. 
During deliberation on the plan, other ministries dispatch 
representatives to the Economic Planning Council meetings to insure 
that no "plan" creates measures counter to the interests of their 
ministries. Economic planning does not "plan," but , rather, 
reaches a consensus for general economic targets by giving the 
public and the private sector ~ say in the process. The economic 
plan that is formulated does not have any binding power. However, 
it may legitimize the budgetary demands of the ministries 
consistent with plan in the first few years of its implementation. 
The Ministry of Finance carefully intervenes behind-the-scenes at 
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-Economic Council meetings to insure that its discretionary 
budgetary powers are not limited (Shoven 277). 
Richard J. Samuels, director of the MIT-Japan Science and 
Technology Program, describes the "vision-making" process as a form 
of "reciprocal consent." "In exchange for the use of public 
resources, private industry grants the State the power to define 
industrial structure in the national interest" (Tucker 25). This 
process creates a stable framework of economic growth benefiting 
everyone. 
In the 1950s, MITI had fully developed its system of nurturing 
industries. First, an investigation for a basic need in an 
industry is made and a basic policy statement is drafted. Second., 
foreign currency allocations are authorized by MITI and funding is 
provided by the Japanese Development Bank. Third, licenses are 
granted for imported technology. Fourth, the industry is 
designated as "strategic" in order to give it special and 
accelerated depreciation on its investments. Fifth, the industry 
is provided with land on which to build its installations, either 
free of charge, or at a nominal cost. Sixth, the industry is given 
key tax breaks. Finally, MITI creates an "administrative guidance 
cartel" to regulate competition and coordinate investment among the 
firms in the industry (Johnson 236). 
When formulating policy, the goal of MITI is to create orderly 
markets with a limited number of strong competitors. Unlike the 
united States, MITI is not concerned that excessive concentration 
of power will lead to monopolies. The greatest fear of MITI is 
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that excessive competition will lead to "chaos." Also, unlike the 
united states, the Japanese view the international marketplace -
not just the domestic-economy - as the standard in which to measure 
a company's market share. For these reasons, MITI tolerates and 
creates significant concentrations of economic power in giant 
financial/industrial groups, such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui (Tucker 
25) . 
In addition to heavily focusing on industry, Japanese research 
and development is oriented almost entirely toward the civilian 
economy.. In Japan, the main government body responsible for 
industrial research and development is the Agency of Industrial 
Science and Technology (AST), a branch of MITI. The agency runs 16 
national laboratories with a staff of 300 bureaucrats and 3,500 
scientists. They perform research in fields ranging from advanced 
materials to electronics. 
Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese government funding of 
research and development is relatively modest compared to the 
united states. In the united states, the government accounts for 
32% of all research and development expenditures in the non-defense 
sectors (Asao 25). However, when military research is included, 
the united states figure is more than 50% of the research and 
development budget (Tucker 27). On the other hand, in Japan the 
government provides only 28% of all research and development 
spending (Asao 25). Only about 2% of the Japanese research and 
development budget goes to mili tary research. Moreover, the 
research and development is targeted at the civilian economy, 
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whereas in the united states research and development goes to the 
military, with hopes that spin-off technologies will be applicable 
to the civilian economy. 
The entire "administrative guidance" proposal represents a 
description of a desirable direction for future industrial 
activities. The process is noncoercive. Individual firms are free 
to ignore the "vision", and can and often do establish their own 
objectives. Far from colluding with business, Japanese industrial 
. 
policy t.ries to foster a climate in which mechanisms of free and 
competi ti ve markets can operate. When the government intervenes in 
the market place, it does so, not to replace or distort the market 
system, but to complement and improve it. 
Section IV 
Theory of MITI 
Schc.lars are divided as to the importance of MITI' s industrial 
policy in creating the postwar miracle in Japan. "Chalmers 
Johnson, professor of political science at the University of 
California (Berkeley), views MITI as the activist hub of the 
'developmental state'" in his book MITI and the Japanese Miracle 
(Tucker 22). Phyllis A. Genther, author of "Japanese Government-
Business Relations," believes that to understand MITI, one needs to 
look at the culture, history, administrative rules and 
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-competitiveness of the Japanese people. David Friedman, in The 
Misunderstood Miracle, argues that the industrial policies of MITI 
did not affect the growth of Japan as much as did their decision to 
use flexible production techniques as opposed to the mass 
production techniques of the united states. Friedman feels that 
flexible manufacturing allows the Japanese to use the technology to 
fill the niches that mass-produced products leave in the markets. 
other analysts argue that the subsidies of MITI are relatively 
modest, and that the ministry is far from perfect in its choice of 
which industries to support and advise. For example, "MITI ' s 
desire t:o consolidate the auto industry around Toyota and Nissan 
served the interests of those firms and of struggling smaller firms 
whom they might absorb, but not the stronger medium-sized firms who 
carried on independently; the alliances made by the latter with the 
U. s. aut.omobile producers hardly served MIT I 's preferences" (Caves 
151) • 
According to Masahiko Aoki, there are three views regarding the 
role of the bureaucracy in the Japanese economy. The first view is 
the "rat.ionality view" which views the bureaucracy as contributing 
to the efficiency of the Japanese economy by being an independent 
rational actor in the political-economic process. The "adversary 
view," contradicts the first by regarding bureaucratic intervention 
in the market mechanism as ineffective and redundant. Bureaucratic 
intervention is even considered to be harmful to economic 
efficiency and other social values. The third view is the 
"interest-representation view." This holds that the bureaucracy 
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represents specific or pluralist interests in the economy. This 
view has the bureaucracy maintaining a quasi principal-agency 
relationship with constituent interests (Shoven 265). 
Even within each view, there are varying perspectives as to the 
exactly role the Japanese bureaucracy plays in economic affairs. 
In the rationalist view the notion of "Japan, Inc." emerges. This 
view holds that the Japanese economy is a bureaucracy-led coherent 
system. others see the rational view as one whereby the 
bureaucracy compliments the functioning of the market mechanism. 
Even among the "complementarists" the role of bureaucracy differs. 
For example, some argue that "economic planning administered by the 
government complements the failure of future markets to arise and, 
thus, helps form consensual expectations in the private sector" 
(Shoven 266). This then allows a foundation for individual firms 
to make macro-consistent investment plans. 
claims that industrial policy fosters the 
Another viewpoint 
growth of infant 
industries to become internationally competitive. A final version 
of this viewpoint holds that government-sponsored research-and-
development cooperatives in the computer industry make up for the 
risk-taking venture-capital market that is lacking in Japan (Shoven 
266) • 
The adversary view, held by neo-classical economists I advocates 
a removal of government intervention from the competitive process. 
This view believes in the supremacy of the market mechanism. T. 
Yakushiji presents a different perspective of the adversary view by 
having the rationalistic and adversary viewpoints alternating. 
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Yakushiji's view maintains, "once the policy of fostering a stable 
structure in a particular industry becomes successful, the industry 
inevitably starts to drift away from intervention. At that stage, 
the bureaucracy tends to become coercive, and unless a new relation 
is created, the intervention is no longer lasting or effective" 
(Shoven 266). 
The interest-representation view may be found in the theory of 
the "triad." This theory explains that the exclusive coalition of 
the burE!aucracy, the ruling Liberal Oemocratic Party (LOP), and big 
business rule the Japanese politically. Recently, some authors 
have noted that the bureaucracy, in coalition with the LOP, has 
expanded its mediation of the interests of a greater variety of 
social groups. The bureaucracy-LOP coalition strikes a balance 
between all these groups by distributing the social surplus made 
possible by economic growth. This perspective is held by many 
Japanese scholars in political science (Shoven 266) . 
Aoki characterizes the bureaucratic budgetary and planning 
processes in Japan as a "quasi-social bargaining game" played by 
various bureaucratic entities that act as agents of respective 
constituent social groups and referees of the game. This 
bargaining game is referred to as "administrative pluralism." M. 
Muramatsu and E. S. Krauss maintain that although diverse interest 
groups have access to policy-making at various points, boundaries 
between the state and society become somewhat blurred in patterned 
pluralism. This occurs even though the bureaucracy is still strong 
enough to structure policy patterns (Shoven 267). 
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In virtually all developed countries, mediation among various 
interests occur through social bargaining. However, the mediation 
process in Japan is unique due to the unique role played by the 
bureaucracy. Bureaucrats, in the interest-mediation role, may be 
thought of as acting as agents for their constituent interests. 
Their role is different from that of agents in ordinary principal-
agency relations, as is the role for western congress-bureaucracy 
relations, because of Japan's unique incentive and tenure structure 
in which bureaucrats participate. Also, in order to mobilize and 
accumulate the political resources necessary for effective interest 
representation, Japanese bureaucrats need to legitimize their 
behavior by assuring their actions are beneficial to rational 
interests that lie beyond their specific interests. According to 
Aoki, this need places the Japanese bureaucracy into two roles: a 
semi-aut,onomous rational regulator (policymaker) and a quasi-agent 
of specific interests in the economy (Shoven 267). 
Aoki brings forth the notion that the bureaucracy of a firm has 
isomorphic structures when focusing on the dual role of the 
bureaucracy in its interaction with the private sector. Once a 
general policy/strategic orientation is framed, both the 
bureaucracy and the firm adapt to emergent demands and needs 
arising from constituents. Neither the bureaucracy nor the 
management of the firm control constituent units vertically 
according to a clear-cut line of control and task performance. 
They rel!.ol ve confl icts and coordinate tasks between constituent 
units as much as possible through horizontal bargaining. They do 
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not dictate a centralized solution according to a well-defined, 
centralized objective. All of these properties provide the 
foundation for the political process of pluralism administered by 
the bureaucracy (Shoven 268). These properties, also, provide the 
"micro-micro-economic" adjustment process with semi-autonomous 
.. 
problem-solving with semi-horizontal (rather than hierarchical) 
coordination. This characterization seems to be at odds with the 
Western notion of an authoritarian and hierarchical Japanese social 
system. To the contrary, it clearly represents the impressions of 
most foreigners who have had contact with Japanese businessmen and 
bureaucrats. "It is not clear who does have the real decision 
making power in Japanese organizations" (Shoven 268). 
However one thing is clear, the Japanese government is not a 
monolit,hic system as envisioned in the Japan, Inc. myth. "The 
Japanese bureaucracy is a multitude of entities (ministries and 
agencies and their bureaus, divisions, etc.), each of which has its 
own jurisdictional sphere, acquires its political resources through 
interactions with other bureaucratic and private entities, and is 
staffed by bureaucrats whose motivations are conditioned by unique 
structures of rewards and tenure" (Shoven 268). Each bureaucratic 
entity has two aspects. One aspect is as a rational/adversarial 
public regulator over private activities in its jurisdictional 
sphere. ~he other aspect is as an agent representing the interests 
of its jurisdictional constituents through other interests in the 
bureaucratic coordinating process (Shoven 268). 
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-The first aspect of the bureaucracy as a public regulator is 
the focal point for the rationality and adversarial perspectives. 
This aspect is inseparable from and intertwined with the 
representati ve aspect. Through the representative role, each 
bureaucratic entity provides its jurisdictional constituents with 
access to policy-making. Iri contrast to high-level political 
appointees in the American system, the tenure of Japanese 
bureaucrats are insulated from changes in the Cabinet and electoral 
results. Why and how are the Japanese bureaucrats receptive to the 
needs of constituent interests? What is their incentive to act as 
quasi-agents of their constituents? (Shoven 269). 
Most. elite bureaucrats start their careers by passing the class 
A (ko) civil, service examination while enrolled in one of the 
prestigious universities. They are then recruited by particular 
ministries upon graduation. There is a pecking order among the 
ministries as to who gets the best and brightest graduates. The 
Ministr}' of Finance (MOF) gets first pick, followed by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs 
Industr}' (MITI) • 
and the Ministry of International Trade 
Those elite bureaucrats referred to 
and 
as 
"qualified" persons on the "career (gymi) team" - who number a 
little more than 10,000 - normally remain in one ministry until 
retirement from the bureaucracy, except for occasional temporary 
transfers (shukko) to related ministries in mid-career (Shoven 
269). All bureaucrats are regularly rotated among various sections 
and bureaus within a ministry throughout their careers. 
26 
-.-. 
New class officers in MITI circulate among various jobs in 
different sections (bureaucrats call this sotomawari, or going 
around the track). Most members will be posted overseas for a year 
in a consulate, an embassy, or an office of the Japanese External 
Trade Organization. On the other hand, non-elite class B officers 
do not circulate as much. The 'pattern among them is to settle down 
in one section for years. This process is called a "walking 
di'ctionary" or "human encyclopedia" (iki-j ibiki) - a term used for 
those who do detailed work of a section or someone who shows new 
career officers the ropes (Johnson 63). 
In their first few years, the bureaucrats progress rapidly 
through the administrative hierarchy. Most become section heads 
(kakaricho) at an average age of 29.1 years. Progression after 
that rank becomes competitive. The average age of a division 
director (kacho) is 42.1 years and the average age of a director-
in-general of a bureau (kyokucho) is 50.2 years. The pinnacle of 
the bureaucratic career is the permanent vice-ministership 
(jimujikan) in a ministry, which is attained at an average age of 
55 years. The term of the vice-minister is not long either, 
lasting one to two years (Shoven 269). 
Because there are only a limited number of bureau chief 
positions in a ministry, not every member in a class can be one. 
Those who are promoted are still in the running for vice-
ministership. Those who are not are compelled to resign. This 
resignat:ion is known in Japanese as "to descend from heaven" 
(amakudari) . They "descend" into a lucrative job in a public 
27 
--
corporation or private industry. Ultimately, everyone must 
"descend" because of pressure from the new entering class advancing 
from below (Johnson 65). This practice is dictated by the rigid 
seniority system of the bureaucracy. Also, it provides private 
businesses with liaisons to the government an important 
communication factor between state and society. 
competition in maneuvering for high positions in a ministry 
normally occurs between classes and not individuals. The process 
of separating out those who will resign early and those who will 
stay in the ministry is known as kata-taki (the tap on the 
shoulder) or mabiki (thinning out). The vice-minister and the 
chief of the Secretariat have this responsibility, as well as 
finding good positions for retired officials on corporate boards. 
The final weeding out is done at the vice-ministerial level, when 
one man from one class is chosen by the outgoing vice-minister as 
his own replacement. All of the new vice-minister's classmates 
must resign to insure his absolute seniority. The new vice-
minister then ensures that these high ranking officials (and 
classmates) "descend" to good positions in industry. New positions 
for retiring vice-ministers are found for them by the minister and 
by the ministry's elder statesmen (Johnson 65). 
The demand for amakudari bureaucrats is diverse. The LOP in 
relatively underdeveloped localities recruits potential candidates 
for governors and Diet members to promote local interests. 
Industrial associations and private companies recruit spokesmen and 
managers. Some retired bureaucrats take executive positions in 
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public corporations that are engaged 
jurisdictional concerns with public funds. 
in financing private 
Finally, others hold 
memberships on various councils that. report to their respective 
ministers and continue to mediate the various private interests 
represented there (Shoven 270). 
By llsing the personal communications networks (jinmyaku) that 
were establi~hed during their terms as bureaucrats, the amakudari 
bureaucrats can gain access to important policy information that 
might be relevant to the interests of the constituencies which 
recrui ted them. Because incumbent bureaucrats are regularly 
rotated among various sections and bureaus, they are insulated from 
direct influence from the amakudari bureaucrats. Also, the young 
incumbent bureaucrats are too ambitious to be swayed by specific 
jurisdictional constituents and screen their interests with 
relative autonomy (Shoven 270). 
How,ever, because amakudari opportunities offer considerable 
rewards, monetary and non-monetary, to the successful bureaucrat, 
individuals are motivated to develop their ministerial and 
individual reputations throughout their careers. This enhances 
their post-bureaucratic opportunities by being receptive to the 
interests of their constituents. Therefore, amakudari bureaucrats 
successfully link the public and private sectors. Although, 
amakudari bureaucrats are not in the position to exercise direct 
influence over the decision-making of the incumbents, the amakudari 
can circulate opinions about the "reputation" of the incumbents. 
This, in turn, may affect their bureaucratic careers and post-
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-retirement opportunities. Therefore, the amakudari practice 
provides a subtle mechanism for absorbing constituent interests 
into the bureaucratic process (Shoven 271). 
Another important part of the policy-making process concerns 
the zokq (political tribes) of the LOP. "The zoku of a ministry is 
an informal group of influential LOP Diet members clustered around 
the ministerial jurisdictions" (Shoven 271). A member of the Diet 
becomes a zoku member by acquiring knowledge, influence, and power 
related to the affairs of that ministry. Zoku members have gained 
considerable expertise and access to information regarding the 
affairs of the relevant ministry. sometimes they have influence 
over appointments of retiring bureaucrats to their amakudari 
positions. Zoku politicians have surpassed the bureaucrats in 
terms of capabilities. The commitment of the zoku is indispensable 
for the ministry in ensuring passage of desired legislation in the 
Diet. The bureaucrat must treat the zoku carefully. Thus, 
together with amakudari bureaucrats, zoku have become important in 
recognizing and channeling emerging constituent demands to the 
relevant ministries (Shoven 271). 
Besides the receptiveness of bureaucratic entities to 
constituent interests, the relationship between the bureaucracy and 
its constituents is not a simple principal-agency relation as 
bureaucratic-congressional relations are viewed in the United 
states. In principal-agency relations, agents must follow the 
instruction of the principal, and the authority of an agent can be 
terminated by the principal at any time. However, Japanese 
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-ministri.es are authorized to draft and propose laws on their own 
ini tiati.ve, as they feel appropriate, to the Diet through the Prime 
Minister. Furthermore, Japanese ministries are continual bodies 
established by statutes and staffed with career bureaucrats who do 
not get terminated with a change in cabinet or electoral result. 
Thus, Japanese ministries have" more autonomy than normal agents in 
principal-agent relations. This fact raises the following 
questions: (1) what is the objective of a ministry and (2) how is 
the obj E~cti ve of the ministry related to constituent interests and 
motives of its career bureaucrats? (Shoven 272) 
Even though competition among bureaucrats in a ministry is 
intense, of primary concern for each one is the growth and 
maintenance of the political influence of their ministry. A strong 
ministry will enhance the lifetime opportunities of the 
bureaucrats. The more politically influential the ministry and the 
more instrumental role the bureaucrats played in it, the better are 
their chances in amakudari positions in the private sector and in 
the influential network of communications between the bureaucracy 
and the private sector (Shoven 272). "Thus, in language familiar 
to economists, the lifetime career opportunities during, as well as 
after, bureaucratic service for bureaucrats may be said to be 
related to maximization of the political stock of the ministry in 
which they work" (Shoven 272). 
Acc4:>rding to Aoki, the resources that the ministry can mobilize 
to implement policy include the following: 
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-1. Fiscal funds allocated to the ministry and available for 
public expenditure in the interest of jurisdictional 
constituents; financial funds financed mainly through 
postal savings and allocated, according to the legislated 
annual Public Investment and Financing Plan, to public 
financial corporations under ministerial control and made 
available as loans to or investments in jurisdictional 
interests. 
2. Incumbent officials recruited through the highly 
competitive civil service examination and trained on the 
job; the network of its amakudari bureaucrats through 
which ministerial policy may be effectively propagated to 
the private sector and through which jurisdictional 
interests may be effectively absorbed. 
3. Authority to propose laws to the Diet through the prime 
minister, and good working relations with zoku 
politicians that can be relied on to strengthen the 
possibility that proposed laws will be enacted in the 
Diet. 
4. The capability of exercising regulatory power, either 
according to statutes or by moral suasion, often referred 
to as "administrative guidance." (Shoven 273). 
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-The ability of the ministries to reproduce these resources 
is dependent upon two factors: the "utility" of ministerial policy 
to its jurisdictional constituents and the reputation of the 
ministry among the general public (or the legitimacy of its policy 
beyond specific interests). These two factors are important to the 
political stock of a ministry. "The utility of a ministry to its 
jurisdic:tional constituents is, basically, determined by the 
effectiveness of its representation of those constituents in the 
bureaucratic process. " (Shoven 273) . However, interest 
representation is not enough. without a good reputation among the 
general public, it is difficult for a ministry to sustain command 
of poli'tical resources, and its long-term viability may become 
weakened (Shoven 273). 
When a ministry supplies "utility" to its jurisdictional 
constituents and builds its reputation among the public, it can 
enhance its political prestige and career opportunities, 
bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic, for its officials. It can 
mobilizE~ the support of the zoku for budgets and legislation. 
Also, it can recruit more entrants to bureaucratic careers, and 
legitimize its continued use of regulatory powers. If the general 
reputation of a ministry is damaged, its ability to recruit 
competent college graduates away from other ministries may be 
compromised. Also, under the career-long employment system, a 
minist~{ cannot recruit a trouble-shooter to recoup loses incurred 
from a damaged reputation (Shoven 274). 
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-Therefore, each ministry must balance constituent interests and 
the general welfare (national interests) in its policy-making and 
implementation so as to maximize its political stock. "Dual 
representation of both general and specific interests gives the 
bureaucracy the appearance of relative autonomy and neutrality from 
specific: interests, in spite of its quasi-agent role" (Shoven 274) . 
The rationality and adversary views referred to at the 
beginning of this section focus their analysis on one aspect of the 
bureaucracy - that of a public regulator. However, this aspect 
overlooks the inseparable dual character of the Japanese 
bureaucracy. The other aspect is the quasi-social bargaining by 
various bureaucratic entities with each acting as the quasi agent 
of cons1::ituent interests. Aoki calls this process, "administered 
pluralism" (Shoven 274). 
In the previous section, each bureaucratic entity (ministries, 
bureaus" divisions, and sections) controls and represents its own 
jurisdictional constituency. More precisely, there are two types 
of bureaucratic entities, and only one type has a clearly 
delineated jurisdiction. Bureaus (and sections) genkyoku are of 
this fi.rst type. These bureaus maintain close contact with 
organizations representing their jurisdictional constituents 
through which they absorb consti tuent interests and implement 
regulation over their jurisdictional spheres. The other type, 
called coordinating bureaus by Aoki, include the bureaus whose 
primary functions are coordination, budgeting, planning, and 
monitoring. Each genkyoku and ministry represents interests of 
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-consti tuents and is engaged in quas i-social bargaining. This 
bargaining is subject to the multi-layered arbitration of 
coordinating offices. The arbitration of coordinating offices is 
directed less by a well-defined policy objective than by ad hoc 
rules of thumb, such as "incrementalism" (Shoven 276). The 
essential idea of incrementalism is shown in the Japanese budget 
process. "The budget allocations to (or the budget demands by) 
ministries increase (or decrease) equiproportionally every year" 
(Shoven 276). Therefore, once a budget allocation pattern is set 
by coordinating bureaus, a quasi-social bargaining takes place 
between genkyoku and the power of the coordinating bureau wanes. 
It should, also, be noted that "shadow bargaining" among 
corresponding zoku takes place. The zoku politicians are, usually, 
influent~ial members of the LOP and settle important conflicts 
between ministries among themselves. These political settlements 
often are quick and decisive, whereas interministerial disputes 
settled by bureaucrats would normally take a long time and might 
end in stalemate (Shoven 277). 
Aoki raises the question that is the conventional rule of 
incrementalism consistent with efficient and stable resolution of 
conflicts among political-stock-maximizing ministries? Aoki 
provides a "dual parametric rule," in which management acts as a 
sort of arbiter among constituent bodies of the bureaucracy. This 
rule suggests under certain regularity conditions, efficient and 
stable resolution of participants in the firm dictates that rents 
accrued to the firm be distributed to each constituent body 
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according to a respective-share parameter. It, also, dictates that 
other managerial decisions regarding layoffs, investments, and so 
forth, be made by averaging policies optimal to the constituent 
bodies, again with the corresponding share-pa~ameters as weights. 
The share-parameters represent relative bargaining powers of the 
constituent bodies (Shoven 277). 
section V 
Allocative Efficiency 
Of course, if the MIT I did not use administrative guidance, 
market forces would reallocate resources to other uses. However, 
this raises the question is MITI' s administrative guidance 
efficient in redirecting Japanese resources? Only limited evidence 
is available on the effects of MITI I s custodial efforts on economic 
welfare. It is important to realize that MITI's policies have not 
been applied across the board to all Japanese industries. Its 
attention is only attracted to those businesses thought to be 
critical to general goals of economic growth or those raising 
specific economic problems. Furthermore, MITI has only limited 
direct influence toward small businesses. Today, the interests 
of the small firms in Japan are protected by the Conservative 
Party, and financial institutions have been created to assist these 
industries. During the pre-war period, laborers in large firms 
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fought for higher wages, whereas small firm workers accepted lower 
wages because opportunities for independence were reduced in giant 
factories. The larger firms' system of lifetime employment 
contributed to the demand for increased wages. The small firms' 
workers accepted lower wages as the price for training that might 
lead them to become independent factory owners. Because of the 
war, th~:! military had a strong interest in the small firms to 
protect domestic production. Due to this need to protect domestic 
producti.on in Japan, the Conservative Party backed the small firms. 
These small firms are still protected by the Conservative Party, 
which allows them to find their niche in the Japanese economy. 
MITI has a minimal hand in guiding these small businesses that 
contribute immensely to domestic production. 
Today, most analysts believe in Chalmers Johnson's view that 
the bureaucratic regulation of MITI contributes to allocative 
efficiency. However, the idea that bureaucratic control fosters 
advances! in efficiency rests partially on the assumption that the 
Japanese state could effectively plan and implement policies that 
change the market behavior of the firms. 
However, the bureaucratic regulation view of Johnson does not 
apply tel the Japanese economic situation. MITI's attempt to limit 
the number of firms, promote consolidation, cartels, scale 
economies and stable markets did not 'transform industries. In fact 
when MI'I'I tried to consolidate industries, the large firms rejected 
MITI's guidance and managed to thrive on their own! Examples of 
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-where firms did not follow MITI' s policies can be found in the 
aluminuIB, auto, machine tool, and other industries. 
As an example, if MITI's bureaucratic regulation were 
successful in the machine tool industry, we should have observed a 
governmE~nt creating economies of scale in prewar machinery 
industries, nurturing firms immediately after the war, 
consolidating production to create scale economies, and direct 
movement into new technologies. To do so, Japan, guided by its 
economic bureaucracy (MITI), should have built a more efficient, 
consolidated industry that would have contributed to its 
competitive success. "Instead, we observed policy and planning 
efforts that were ineffective; a decentralized machine tool 
industry; and, in particular, government initiatives that had no 
apparent relation to numerically controlled (machine tool) 
breakthroughs" (Friedman 124). Although Johnson's bureaucratic 
regulation view contends that Japanese industry was guided by a 
"strong state," the machine tool industry, as well as many others, 
exhibits an unbroken record of policy failures. "From the 
Depression to the present there is not one example of the adoption, 
let alone success, of a MITIor an Mel initiative" (Friedman 125) . 
If one thinks of a strong state as one that sets goals then 
manipulates financial and other incentives to achieve them, Japan 
appears to be extremely weak. In fact, the government was forced 
to provide resources, but could not insist that its goals be met in 
exchange (Friedman 125). 
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-other analysts believe that the Japanese system follows the 
"market theory." This theory holds that industrial outcomes are a 
function. of competition by generating efficient solutions to market 
imperatives. MITI's view of "efficient solutions" is to 
consolidate industries to create scale economies to meet market 
demands. MITI would rather have monopolistic companies competing 
in the market, then too many smaller companies creating "chaos." 
Un'fortunately, MITI' s policies did not lead to anticipated market 
outcomes. wi thout a doubt, the ministry's pol icies have engendered 
some allocative inefficiency by strengthening collusion and some 
technical inefficiency by distorting incentives for additions to 
capacity and diverting rivalry into nonprice channels (Caves 152). 
On the other hand, MITI has beaten down substantially the 
price that Japan pays for technology imports. Some of its 
standardization and rationalization have surely lowered real costs. 
"Indeed, in oligopolistic industries with partial collusion its 
logically possible that firms become inefficiently diversified, so 
that an imposed rationalization limiting the items each firm 
produced could potentially attain scale economies without giving 
away a significant increase in monopolistic restriction" (Caves 
152). 
In addition, MITI (and other bureaucracies) may create 
(substantial) gains via their role as information gatherers and 
disseminators. The incredibly detailed statistics pertaining to 
each sectors output and potential relative to international 
competitors which is (and has been) collected by MITI minimizes the 
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-costs of information collections and processing for firms. In 
short, MITI turns the information gathering and "market" scanning 
functions into a public good distributed to all firms - small and 
large, foreign and non-foreign (McMillan 53). 
CONCLUSION 
Did the industrial policies and administrative guidance of MITI 
create the postwar "Japanese Miracle?" Some of the targeted 
industries of MITI (such as microelectronics and computers) 
performed well, while others, such as commercial aircraft and 
shipbuilding, did not. Even though MITI did not target the 
automobile industry and consumer electronics industries, they 
thrived beyond expectations without government favors. 
In fact, when MITI had strong enforcement over imports of 
foreign technology, its power was not absolute. During the mid-
1960s, MITI advised the eight automobile producers in Japan to 
merge into three major groups. The groups were to each specialize 
in one category of cars to achieve economies of scale and improve 
international competitiveness. However, the industry opposed the 
directives of MITI, and two of the major automobile firms, Nissan 
and Toyota, developed into strong international competi tors on 
their own. The same situation happened in the steel industry , 
where MITI advised production capacity regulation. Kawasaki and 
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-Sumitomo steel firms did not join the administrative guidance 
cartel of MITI, and they flourished on their own. 
Although MITI had its share of successes, it, also, had many 
failures in industrial policy structuring. Thomas Pepper of the 
Hudson Institute (Washington, D. C.) "contends that MITI' s 
industrial policy was far less important to Japan's rapid postwar 
growth than was a confluence of macroeconomic and historical 
factors, including united states defense guarantees, a stable 
political system, the abundance of skilled managers and cheap but 
motivated labor, the availability of western technology, an 
economic climate favorable to investment, the undervaluation of the 
yen, and the great size and rapid growth of consumer demand" 
(Tucker 23) •. 
The Japanese miracle has long been attributed to a monolithic 
government/industrial complex known as "Japan, Inc." However, 
most analysts today would agree with Thomas Pepper that even though 
the Stat.e has had a long tradition of intervening in almost every 
aspect clf the economy, the economic success of Japan has resulted 
from a unique blend of cultural, historical, economical and social 
factors, in which government policy has played a significant, but 
not dominant, role. 
41 
-, 
References 
Asao, Sinichiro. 
Policies." 
"Myths and Realities of Japan's Industrial 
The Wall street Journal 24 Oct 1983: A25. 
Caves, :Richard E. and Masu Uekusa. Industrial Organization 
In Japan. Washington: Brookings Institute, 1976. 
Cullison, A. E. 1991. "Japan's 'Old Boy' Network." Journal of 
Commerce 9 Jan: A8. 
Friedman, David. The Misunderstood Miracle: 
Development and Political Change in Japan. 
Cornell, 1988. 
Industrial 
New York: 
Johnson, Chalmers. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of 
Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford U. 
Press, 1982. 
Kaplan, Eugene J. 1972. Japan, The Government - Business 
Relationship: A Guide for the American Businessman. 
Washington: GPO. 
Okimoto, Daniel I., and Thomas P. Rohlen. 1982. Inside the 
Japanese System: Readings on Contemporary Society and 
Political Economy. Stanford: Stanford U. Press. 
Okimoto, Daniel I., Takuo Sugano and Frankl in B. weinstein. 
1984. Competitive Edge: The Semiconductor Industry in the 
U.S. and Japan. Stanford: Stanford U. Press. 
Patrick, Hugh. 1986. JaDan's High Technoloav Industries: 
Lessons and Limitations of Industrial Policy. Seattle: 
U. of Washington Press. 
Shoven, John B., ed. Government Policy Towards Industry in the 
united states and Japan. New York: Cambridge, 1988. 
Taylor, Jared. Shadows of the Rising Sun: A critical View of the 
'Japanese Miracle'. New York: Marrow, 1983. 
Tucker, Jonathon B. "Managing the Industrial Miracle." High 
Technology 157 (1985): 22-29. 
u.S. Congress. 1990. 
Economic Challenge. 
Joint Economic Committee. 
Washington: GPO. 
Japan's 
42 
..-.- .. 
